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Synthesis

The pathology of command and control: a formal synthesis
Michael Cox 1
ABSTRACT. One of the most important theories in the study of environmental governance and policy is the pathology of command
and control, which describes the negative consequences of top-down, technocratic governance of social and ecological systems. However,
to date, this theory has been expressed somewhat inconsistently and informally in the literature, even by the seminal works that have
established its importance and popularized it. This presents a problem for the sustainability science community if it cannot be sure of
the precise details of one of its most important theories. Without such precision, applications and tests of various elements of the
theory cannot be conducted reliably to advance the knowledge of environmental governance. I address this problem by synthesizing
several seminal works to formalize this theory. The formalization involves the identification of the individual elements of the theory
and a diagrammatic description of their relationships with each other that unfold in a series of semi-independent causal paths. Ideally,
with such a formalization, scholars can use this theory more reliably and more meaningfully in their future work. I conclude by discussing
the implications this theory has for the governance of natural resources.
Key Words: centralization; command and control; theoretical synthesis
INTRODUCTION
Many scholars have criticized the governance and management
of social and ecological systems by centralized bureaucratic
agencies. Of these, several works stand out for their
comprehensiveness and the academic impact of their arguments
(Holling and Meffe 1996, Scott 1998, Acheson 2006). Moreover,
although there is a large amount of literature that is broadly
relevant to this topic, each of these three works is distinctive in
the extent to which it isolates distinct elements and processes that
constitute this governance and management dynamic, and each
provides illustrative examples of these processes.
There are common elements across each of these three works,
namely the presence of a centralized, technocratic governance
system that imposes “technical fixes” on a target system by
applying a large amount of control. Holling and Meffe (1996)
describe what they call “the pathology of natural resource
management,” which results from a “command and control” style
of natural resource management. Acheson (2006) describes the
failure of several different broad types of natural resource
management, including the approach of top-down, “scientific”
management.
Scott’s (1998) approach is distinct in that he focuses not only on
natural resource management but also on the governance of social
systems. He describes several elements common to centralized
governance that he argues lead to predictably negative results. He
labels these as follows: an “authoritarian ordering of nature and
society,” “high modernist ideology,” an “authoritarian state,” and
a “prostrate civil society.” Scott’s (1998:5) central argument reads,
“In sum, the legibility of a society provides the capacity for largescale social engineering, high-modernist ideology provides the
desire, the authoritarian state provides the determination to act
on that desire, and an incapacitated civil society provides the
leveled social terrain on which to build.”
The theory of the pathology of command and control (TPCC) is
an important theory in the field of environmental governance.
However, to date, this theory has been expressed somewhat
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inconsistently and informally in the literature, even by these
seminal works. The arguments are expressed solely in natural
language, which allows for multiple interpretations of the key
concepts and their relationships.
This presents a problem for the research communities that engage
with this theory if they cannot be reliably sure of its details.
Without such precision and consistency, applications and tests of
various elements of the theory cannot be conducted reliably to
advance the knowledge of environmental governance. More
generally, communication among scientists can be severely
hampered if each can be using the same term to mean something
quite different, without anyone necessarily knowing that this is
the case.
A very popular and important theory that has been the subject
of just this kind of confusion is the tragedy of the commons, as
popularized by Hardin (1968). There has been much debate and
confusion regarding the precise meaning of this theory, with some
interpreting it to mean that common-property arrangements are
inherently inadequate, and others maintaining that its prediction
of commons decline is in fact predicated on the absence of any
type of property arrangement, such that that the theory is really
describing the tragedy of open-access commons (Ostrom et al.
1999). Ostrom et al. (1999:278) describe the problems that have
arisen from this confusion:
The starkness of Hardin’s original statement has been
used by many scholars and policy-makers to rationalize
central government control of all common-pool resources
and to paint a disempowering, pessimistic vision of the
human prospect. Users are pictured as trapped in a
situation they cannot change. Thus, it is argued that
solutions must be imposed on users by external authorities
While it is important to allow for multiple interpretations of a
particular scientific concept or theory, this comment reflects how
this allowance can become problematic when distinct
assumptions and interpretations are not made explicit. Moreover,
such problems can result even when the tragedy of the commons
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Fig. 1. Formalization of the theory of the pathology of command and control.

theory is not actively being tested by commons scholars but is
being used more as an initial context to motivate a particular
analysis or intervention.
In Ostrom’s (2007) paper advocating for conceptual clarity and
consistency in the analysis of complex social-ecological systems,
she attempts to describe, in a more precise way, what this theory
actually involves. In doing so, she clarifies just what are the
preconditions stipulated by Hardin (1968) for commons
degradation by a set of resource users. Here, I attempt to
accomplish a similar task for TPCC by clarifying and synthesizing
the arguments made by the three authors introduced above. In so
doing, I also attempt to strengthen the connection between the
various literature bases that the seminal works represent. I
conclude by discussing some implications this theory has for the
practice and science of environmental governance.
THE PATHOLOGY OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
Conceptual clarifications
Before describing TPCC, I first clarify what I mean by the term
“theory” as well as the term “command and control.” Theory, as
a term, does not have a consistent definition across, or even
sometimes within, disciplines. My own understanding is based on
Schlager (2007:296), who states that theories “place values on
some of the variables identified as important in a framework,
posit relationships among the variables, and make predictions
about likely outcomes.”
Building on this definition, Cox et al. (2016a:47) define a scientific
theory as “a statement that describes (1) a relationship between

an outcome and a set of independent variables, the values of which
are argued to be sufficient for predicting the outcome, and (2) a
mechanism by which this relationship occurs.” As Cox et al.
(2016a) discuss, many of the variables that are implicitly or
explicitly employed in social-ecological theories are binary,
indicating simply the presence or absence of a particular element
of a phenomenon. In this case, a theory would describe (and
explain) the subsequent appearance of additional elements based
on the occurrence of an initial set, ultimately leading to one or
more outcomes of interest. Each element identified by a theory
then becomes an independent observational prediction and a
means to test the theory. Recognizing that there are other valid
uses of the term, this is my understanding of the term “theory”
when I describe TPCC as such.
Next, I am using the term “command and control” the way
Holling and Meffe (1996) use it: to indicate a problematically large
degree of authoritative centralization and control in a governance
system, rather than a particular type of policy instrument (e.g.,
regulations instead of incentive-based instruments), as it is more
commonly used. I believe this is in fact a more appropriate use of
the term for two reasons. First, the term “command and control”
is generally pejorative and so should probably be used to refer to
a pathology rather than to a set of policy instruments. It is perhaps
unsurprising that the literature that uses “command and control”
to refer to regulations tends to favor other policy options (e.g.,
incentive-based or market-based instruments; Stavins 2003).
Even the use of the term introduced by Holling and Meffe (1996)
should not be taken as a universal condemnation of all of the
elements they and other authors associated with it because several
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aspects of the pathology are somewhat unavoidable, if not in fact
desirable, under some circumstances, as I will discuss in more
depth.

way of resolving a perceived problem and who face
professional incentives to offer particular prescriptions over
others (JA, JS);

Second, an authoritative governing organization directing
activities and behaviors from the top down seems more accurately
to embody the term “command and control” than does, say, a
technological mandate, which, after all, is a common type of
regulation used by comparatively decentralized resource-user
communities in managing their own resources (Acheson and
Wilson 1996).

. High modernism, or the unskeptical belief on the part of
decision makers in the ability of “comprehensive planning
of human settlement and production to bring about social
progress” (Scott 1998:4; JS).

Main elements of the theory
When combined, the arguments from Holling and Meffe (1996),
Scott (1998), and Acheson (2006) produce a theoretical statement
(Fig. 1). This argument is constituted by a set of elements that
either cause each other to occur or contain each other, in which
case, one element helps constitute another. These connections are
denoted by numbered arrows (Fig. 1), which I will refer to in
brackets (e.g., [1]).
The elements of TPCC are grouped in two ways (Fig. 1). First,
there are several different sets of arguments or paths contained
within TPCC. The first path [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] describes the context
that facilitates the development and implementation of a
technical fix. The second path, panacea [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18],
describes how such technical fixes often fit poorly with local
context and thus lead to commons degradation. The third path,
suppression [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 17], describes how technical fixes
suppress local variation and function. The final path, lock-in [19,
20, 21], describes how systems struggle to extricate themselves
from the pathology.
Second, the elements can also be grouped into three sequential
categories along which the paths proceed: (1) the enabling
environment, (2) the technical fix, and (3) outcomes (Fig. 1). I
next provide a brief description of each element, grouped by these
categories. After each element, I label whether the argument is
described in each of the three main works (HM = Holling and
Meffe 1996, JS = James Scott 1998, JA = James Acheson 2006).
1. The enabling path: the problematic development of technical
fixes is associated with the following elements:
. The nature of the problem or system: As Holling and Meffe
(1996:329) describe, much of the problem of applying
command-and-control strategies is a result of their
application to a “complex, nonlinear, and poorly
understood” system (HM);
. Local disempowerment: This reflects what Scott (1998) refers
to as a “prostrate civil society,” or the disempowerment of
local citizens and resource users, which is in turn exacerbated
by the implementation of the technical fix from the top down
(JA, JS);
. Centralized authority: The presence of a centralized,
bureaucratic, decision-making apparatus that claims strong
jurisdictional authority over a large target system and that
has substantially more power than other actors in civil
society (JA, JS);
. Technical professionals: A set of licensed managerial
professionals who promote a technical fix as a particular

2. Each technical fix is aimed at a particular type of problem as
it arises in a target system and can involve technological and
institutional components. Technical fixes involve the following
elements:
. Panacea approach: Each is based on the presumption that
this fix is a panacea or that it can be applied universally
without regard to local context or variation (JA, JS);
. Analytical simplification: Each is based on the presumption
that “the problem is well-bounded, clearly defined, relatively
simple, and generally linear with respect to cause and effect”
(Holling and Meffe 1996:329; HM, JS);. Goal myopia: This
simplification focuses primarily or exclusively on one or a
few “productivist” outputs without much concern for the
trade-offs this might involve. These aspects are then
quantitatively measured to make the system technically
“legible;”
. Analytical leverage: The simplification generally provides a
method to intervene in the system so as to maximize this
output;. Capitalization and control: Implementing a
technical fix requires the exertion of substantial amounts of
control over the target system to impose the analytical
simplifications onto the target system. This control is
frequently exercised through the introduction of new
physical capital and machinery. This process therefore
frequently involves mechanization (HM, JS);. Lack of local
engagement: Technical fixes are frequently implemented
without extensive input from local communities of natural
resource users or much understanding of their institutional
traditions and, therefore, do little to incorporate their local
social and ecological knowledge or practices (JA, JS).
3. Outcomes: Several sets of outcomes result from the
implementation of technical fixes:
. Lack of fit: Rules and technologies that are applied to a
target system without regard to local social or ecological
conditions tend to fit poorly with these conditions (JA, JS);
. Suppression of local social and ecological function: In
imposing its own artificially simplified model of the target
system onto this system, the technical fix reifies this
simplification. As a result, important social and ecological
functions are disregarded and often actively suppressed.
This reduces the functional complexity of the system to
maximize its productivity or efficiency (HM, JA, JS);
. Loss of resilience: This reduction in variation and
complexity undercuts the integrity of the target system and
causes it to be increasingly vulnerable to disturbances (HM,
JS);
. System degradation: As a result of decreased socialecological complexity and poor fit, over time, important
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social and ecological processes and functions that are left
out of the “synoptic view” imposed by managers start to
deteriorate. Because the target system depends on these
processes, the larger system begins to deteriorate as well
(HM, JA, JS);
. Lock-in factors: Several factors that are established by the
enabling environment and the implementation of the
technical fix act to favor the continuation of the governance
regime in the face of system degradation (HM, JA);
. Lock-in: To respond to the symptomatic expressions of
social and ecological degradation in the target system,
additional technical fixes or the original technical fix are
implemented. These then serve to “deepen the pathology”
(Holling and Meffe 1996:331). This process, rather than
affecting underlying drivers of the new problems, treats
proximate symptoms, uncoupling the fundamental drivers
from the experiences of important decision makers, and
allowing the governance of the system to avoid fundamental
changes (HM, JS).
FURTHER UNPACKING THE PATHS
Enabling path
The enabling path [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] is constituted by two elements
describing the target system and three elements of the governance
of this system. For Holling and Meffe (1996) this is a natural
system, while Scott (1998) explicitly entertains both natural and
social systems as subjects of command-and-control style
governance. The primary attributes of the target system, and the
supposed problem associated with it, have been the subject of a
large amount of literature, including Rittel and Webber’s (1973)
discussion of “wicked problems,” and the concept of chaotic
dynamics, both of which have been applied to characterize natural
resource systems that humans govern (Acheson and Wilson 1996,
Jentoft and Chuenpagde 2009).
Similarly, a large amount of literature associated with the study
of resilience and vulnerabilities of social-ecological systems has
emphasized their nonlinear self-reinforcing dynamics, tendency
to stabilize in particular states, and the high levels of irreversibility
in moving from state to state (Scheffer et al. 2001, Gunderson and
Holling 2002). The commonality among these characterizations
is that they emphasize how difficult it is to understand and control
complex, real-world systems and problems because of the
irreversibilities and potentially irreducible uncertainties
associated with their own dynamics as well as the very
interventions designed to manage them.
The second primary feature of the target system is the historical
disempowerment of the human actors it contains. In the context
of commons management settings, such actors are generally
natural resource users. This creates a power imbalance between
the centralized authority and the human subjects it aims to
govern, facilitating the implementation of the technical fix.
Additionally, Scott (1998) and Acheson (2006) emphasize that
the technical fix itself can exacerbate this disempowerment of
local resource users. This can result from lost autonomy, due in
part to the integration of resource users into highly capitalist and
productivist economies, or the “concentration of the resource in
the hands of local elites or corporations” (Acheson 2006:126).

Scott (1998) emphasizes the irony of this outcome given that the
rhetoric of high modernism predicts that social progress will be
wrought from technical interventions.
Turning to features of governance, most prominent is the presence
of a centralized state with authority over a large social-ecological
system paired with a high level of disempowerment of the subjects
of this state’s governance initiatives. States can, in fact, fail in ways
other than those documented here, and Acheson (2006) devotes
some attention to this; because these are somewhat distinct
arguments, they are not included here. Moreover, as Scott (1998)
emphasizes and I emphasize here, the centralized authority need
not be a public entity: the fact that it is hierarchically centralized
is the key feature of the argument.
Next, and equally important, is the presence of a set of technical
professionals who lay claim to generalizable technical knowledge
via the analytical simplifications that provide leverage to exert
control over the target system. When endowed with the ideology
of high modernism and substantial authority over the target
system, such actors can enforce these simplifications with the
predicted results.
Together, these preconditions set the stage for the implementation
of a technical fix. Each technical fix has two primary and mutually
interdependent characteristics: analytical simplification and
panacea thinking [6, 13], which set the stage for the second and
third paths in the pathology. Each of these paths can be seen to
start with the process of analytical simplification because the
implementation of a technical fix to multiple contexts depends
on the prior analytical simplification of such contexts [12].
Panacea path
Holling and Meffe (1996) write little about this path, whereas
Scott (1998) and Acheson (2006) describe ways in which panaceas
can fit poorly with aspects of target systems. The problem of a
lack of social-ecological fit resulting from the application of
institutional and technological panaceas [14, 15] has received
quite a bit of attention in the literature on community-based
natural resource management and the governance of complex
social-ecological systems (Ostrom 1990, 2007). The basic idea is
that in applying a uniform set of rules and technologies to a diverse
set of systems, there will inevitably be some systems with which
these rules and technologies do not fit. This process becomes more
likely when local resource users are not engaged during the
decision-making process in ways that could incorporate local
knowledge and institutions [16, 18]. One important distinction
between this path and the next one (suppression) is that here, the
technical fix introduces new features into the target system that
do not mesh well with existing features, rather than introducing
new features that replace previously existing features.
There are many examples in the literature of a lack of fit between
an intervention and either ecological or social aspects of the target
system. For ecological aspects, Scott (1998) and Acheson (2006)
provide examples of schemes to cultivate and manage certain
crops or livestock that are ill-suited to local natural environments.
Lansing (1991) presents a now famous example wherein changes
introduced by Green Revolution specialists in Balinese Subak
irrigation systems interacted poorly with local pest control
strategies and soil properties. For social aspects, Acheson (2006)
mentions the introduction of irrigation infrastructure that
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interacted poorly with the traditions and institutional customs of
local farmers, while Cox (2014) discusses problems that the New
Mexico, USA state government faced when trying to impose its
water management doctrine on local Hispanic farming
communities.
Suppression path
An important part of the argument of TPCC is that as a
governance system becomes more centralized and more
dominated by technical experts, incentives to enable Scott’s (1998)
synoptic view increase [3, 4, 6]. Thus, one would expect increasing
amounts of analytical oversimplification in more centralized,
bureaucratic systems.
The majority of the analytical simplifications that are constructed
usually have two distinctive characteristics. First, they focus on
one productivist output that is desired from the target system,
such as crop production from an agricultural field, timber
production from a forest, or gross domestic product from an
economy. Second, they offer analytical leverage in the control of
the system to achieve this goal. The latter occur as analytical “just
so stories,” or plausible and intuitive-sounding narratives whose
assumptions often go untested, and which lend themselves to
fashionable institutional arrangements such as certain types of
property rights (e.g., individual transferable quotas). Thus,
analytical simplifications frequently offer up a primary goal for
a system as well as the means by which this goal can be achieved
in a tidy package. This simplification is then applied to the target
system via control [7]. As Holling and Meffe (1996:329–330) state,
“Such efforts attempt to replace natural ecological controls, which
are largely unknown to us and highly complex and variable, with
engineered constructs and manipulations that on the surface seem
entirely within our control.”
Unfortunately, while initially successful, this simplification
process leads to several problems that the authors highlight. Both
Holling and Meffe (1996) and Scott (1998) emphasize the effect
that control has on reduced functional diversity of the target
social or ecological system [8], while Acheson (2006) and Scott
(1998) both emphasize that a lack of engagement with local users
contributes to this suppression [16, 17]. This suppression then
results in a loss of system resilience and thus systemic degradation
[9, 10].
Scott (1998) makes an argument that depends less on the notions
of resilience and disturbance than Holling and Meffe (1996). He
describes a technical intervention as follows: “The formal scheme
was parasitic on informal processes that, alone, it could not create
or maintain. To the degree that the formal scheme made no
allowance for these processes or actually suppressed them, it failed
both its intended beneficiaries and ultimately its designers as well”
(Scott 1998:6). He is arguing that the control exerted on the target
system will suppress and replace critical social or ecological
functions [8], and that without these functions, the target system
will inevitably deteriorate [11].
Essentially, both Holling and Meffe (1996) and Scott (1998) argue
that there are critically important elements left out of the
analytical simplifications of technical managers, and that because
these simplifications determine what can be measured and
therefore controlled technocratically, the governance system will
be blind to much of what matters in the target system. What is

not managed will inevitably be sacrificed in favor of what is
managed, and because the target system depends on these
processes to sustain itself and adapt to disturbances, degradation
will result.
It is important to note that there are well-established counterarguments to this particular element of TPCC. An alternative
scenario could be that, following the establishment of a primary
goal for a target system, other system components are in fact
maintained by the fulfillment of this goal. This could result if
these other components of the system, such as species habitat,
are needed to support the goal and are therefore maintained by
goal myopia. This is the theory behind much of the U.S.
Endangered Species Act, which generally manages for a particular
indicator species with the hope that supporting this species will
ultimately support the larger habitat and target system. There is
a long debate about the merits of single-species vs. ecosystembased management in environmental conservation that reflects
these contradictory arguments (Simberloff 1998).
Lock-in path
The final path in TPCC, which I have labeled lock-in, is a process
by which the governance system becomes locked into its practices
of analytical simplification and control and responds to system
degradation by treating proximate symptoms of the problem
rather than the underlying drivers [19, 20, 21]. This process is a
specific example of a more general phenomenon called “path
dependence,” which has been discussed extensively with respect
to technological, economic, and institutional change (Arthur
1989, 1994, North 1990, Pierson 2000). As Pierson (2000:252)
states:
This conception of path dependence, in which preceding
steps in a particular direction induce further movement
in the same direction, is well captured by the idea of
increasing returns. In an increasing returns process, the
probability of further steps along the same path increases
with each move down that path. This is because the
relative benefits of the current activity compared with
other possible options increase over time. To put it a
different way, the costs of exit—of switching to some
previously plausible alternative—rise. Increasing returns
processes can also be described as self-reinforcing or
positive feedback processes.
Path dependence has also been used to emphasize the possible
presence of multiple self-reinforcing equilibria in economic
systems. Interestingly, Holling and Meffe (1996) devote much of
the second half of their paper to this topic, with respect to
ecological systems. There are parallel sets of literature on the
presence of self-reinforcing processes and multiple equilibria in
economic and ecological systems (e.g., Myerson 1999, Scheffer et
al. 2001).
Of the three works synthesized here, Holling and Meffe (1996:331)
have the most to say about the process of lock-in within TPCC:
“If the response to this pathology by other interests, such as the
environmental community, is exclusively demand for tighter
regulation and prohibition, then the pathology is deepened,
because this applies a command-and-control solution to a
problem initiated by command and control.” They also describe
several factors that cause this behavior: “At the same time,
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economic activities exploiting the resource benefit from success
and expand in the short term, and we witness greater capital
investment in activities such as agricultural production, pulp
mills, suburban development, and fishing and hunting,” which
leads to “...an increasing dependency on continued success in
controlling nature,” and “...with dependency comes denial,
demands by economic interests to keep and expand subsidies, and
pressure for further command and control.” (Holling and Meffe
1996:331).
Much of what drives the lock-in behavior is the original process
of capitalization and control [19, 20]. Scott (1998) does not
explicitly mention this dynamic, but there are examples of it in
his case studies. For example, in describing the development of
“scientific forestry,” Scott (1998:21) describes the following
dynamic:
As pioneers in scientific forestry, the Germans also
became pioneers in recognizing and attempting to remedy
many of its undesirable consequences. To this end, they
invented the science of what they called ‘forest hygiene.’
In place of hollow trees that had been home to
woodpeckers, owls, and other tree-nesting birds, the
foresters provided specially designed boxes. Ant colonies
were artificially raised and implanted in the forest, their
nests tended by local schoolchildren. Several species of
spiders, which had disappeared from the monocropped
forest, were reintroduced. What is striking about these
endeavors is that they are attempts to work around an
impoverished habitat still planted with a single species of
conifers for production purposes. In this case,
“restoration forestry” attempted with mixed results to
create a virtual ecology, while denying its chief sustaining
condition: diversity.
CONCLUSION
Benefits of formalization
There are several ways in which future research can benefit from
the formalization process just discussed. An important point to
make before discussing these is that scholars need not share in
this precise understanding of the theory to benefit from this
exercise. While this could be seen as an exercise in standardization,
the formalization presented here can hopefully support more
rigorous discussions of the different ways in which scholars view
this important theory.
First, the formalization serves as an accessible reference for
scholars to understand the explicit details of TPCC as
characterized by several seminal works. This understanding can
help scholars both to test the empirical predictions that are
supported by the theory and to evaluate the extent to which a case
under examination fits such predictions and thus meaningfully
belongs to a larger population of similar cases that are amenable
to the same theoretical characterizations and analytical
approaches. Second, this exercise also helps scholars understand
the nuances that distinguish how each of these works tends to
view the dynamics involved, with Holling and Meffe (1996) and
Acheson (2006) focusing exclusively on natural resource
management, and Scott (1998) also examining the governance of
social systems. Additionally, whereas Holling and Meffe (1996)
focus exclusively on the suppression path, the other authors also

emphasize the importance of the panacea path; I have shown how
each path ultimately depends on the analytical simplification
inherent in technical fixes. Finally, Holling and Meffe (1996) and
Scott (1998) both provide details with respect to the lock-in path,
which Acheson (2006) does not emphasize. It is thus through the
overlapping descriptions of each work that the full details of the
theory can be understood.
Alternatives to command and control
An interesting question is: If TPCC is commonly accepted and
there are predictable problems with centralized, top-down
governance, are there alternatives that would suffer less from these
problems without incurring their own? Presumably something
with a less top-down focus would be desirable. There are, however,
several problems with the assumption that some type of inverse
theory to TPCC is logically implied by TPCC. Such a theory might
stipulate that private (as opposed to public), decentralized
governance arrangements with more goal diversity and less
control and simplification would perform well. However, there
are several problems with this inverse theory. First, if this
argument is taken to its limit, there would be a total lack of social
control over social and ecological systems whereby individual
actors are free to do what they will. One problem with this
approach is that it leads to the tragedy of the commons (Hardin
1968). Indeed, as Holling and Meffe (1996:329) describe, the ways
in which modern society exerts control over social and ecological
systems “is undeniably to our individual and collective benefit.”
Indeed, some measure of control is implied by any type of
governance, such that the question posed to policy analysts is not
whether control is needed, but rather, how much and what types
of control.
Similarly, some degree of analytical simplification is likewise
necessary, as Scott (1998:11) states when describing technical
knowledge: “Certain forms of knowledge and control require a
narrowing of vision. The great advantage of such tunnel vision
is that it brings into sharp focus certain limited aspects of an
otherwise far more complex and unwieldy reality.” Scott (1998)
emphasizes that, through the process of “administrative
ordering,” the target system is made more legible to centralized
managers and technical experts by providing them a synoptic view
of the system. And regardless of what type of knowledge is being
discussed, any understanding of a target social or ecological
system will be necessarily incomplete. If any governmental
organization tried to measure everything about a target system
that it wanted to affect, it would likely exhaust its resources long
before it was able to accomplish this. This is the argument behind
the indicator species approach.
Additionally, decentralizing will not necessarily alleviate the
problems associated with path dependence and lock-in. As
demonstrated by Cody et al. (2015) and Cox et al. (2016b),
communities of natural resource users, while holding important
advantages such as a wealth of local ecological knowledge (Berkes
2012), are perfectly capable of avoiding fundamental solutions by
choosing technical, symptomatic solutions to their problems. The
factors that encourage lock-in overlap to some extent with the
factors that can make it difficult for communities to act
collectively to sustain a shared resource.
Shifting from public to private management does not necessarily
help either. The status of being public or private does not entirely
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determine the status of being centralized or decentralized: many
modern, private, particularly corporate, actors that manage and
use natural resources are extremely hierarchical and exhibit many
of the same behaviors of analytical simplification and control
through capitalization. As Scott (1998:87) states, “A private
corporation aiming to maximize sustainable timber yields, profit,
or production will map its world according to this logic and will
use what power it has to ensure that the logic of its map prevails.
The state has no monopoly on utilitarian simplifications.”
Moreover, as Fitzgerald (2003) discusses, the public sector’s
infatuation with legibility and control via technical fixes is
mirrored by similar developments in the private sector, as perhaps
most famously represented by the rise of Frederick Taylor’s
scientific management of factories, or “Taylorism,” which has
spread to natural resource management sectors as well.
Additionally, the private sector suffers no less from the processes
of path dependence and lock-in, as the literature on path
dependence makes rather clear (Arthur 1994). In the modern
agricultural sector, for example, a combination of public and
private actors and activities now serve to lock much of that sector
into many of the behaviors observed in TPCC (Cowan and Gunby
1996). Finally, and paradoxically, such privatized management is
often advocated by fairly centralized governmental agencies.
Indeed, many of the analytically simplistic “just so stories”
mentioned earlier advocate for highly decentralized arrangements.
Private property rights and associated policy instruments such as
individual transferable quotas, for example, are frequently argued
by technical professionals to have distinct benefits in achieving
positive social and ecological outcomes (Costello et al. 2008). The
meaningfulness of the public vs. private distinction is not obvious
or clear in such cases.
What should adapt to what?
An additional question that TPCC poses is: Under what
conditions should an attempt be made to address more proximate
symptoms vs. more underlying drivers of a problem? The answer
to this depends in part on what is a symptom vs. an underlying
driver. Pollution, for example, could be considered to be a
symptom of an underlying problem rather than a problem itself,
in which case, the amelioration of this pollution is a symptomatic
solution rather than a fundamental one. This is the perspective
that some scholars from the field of industrial ecology take when
they describe pollution remediation as essentially being “less bad”
(Braungart et al. 2007). Ameliorating the symptoms of
industrially emissive activities enables the continuance of these
same activities, possibly to long-term detriment. Similarly,
Meadows (1999), in her famous work on leverage points, relegates
policy-related interventions to the last place on her list:
But changing these variables rarely changes the behavior
of the national economy system. Whatever cap we put
on campaign contributions, it doesn’t clean up politics.
The Fed’s fiddling with the interest rate hasn’t made
business cycles go away. After decades of the strictest air
pollution standards in the world, Los Angeles’ air is less
dirty, but it isn’t clean. Spending more on police doesn’t
make crime go away.
However, Meadows (1999) does allow for the possibility that such
symptomatic solutions can trigger more substantial structural
change. This may be the most realistic or effective way forward,
depending on just how strongly locked in a system is.

Concluding remarks
I think that TPCC is a powerful theory, not only because of its
importance in the field of environmental governance and
governance more broadly. The issues of simplification, goal
myopia, and control are ubiquitous in decision-making settings.
This includes, for example, the following settings and questions:
. Hiring and admission decisions: What is to be measured and
therefore “valued” in the applicants?
. Personal goals: When are we willing to bear the sacrifices
necessary to achieving a particular goal, and when does the
setting of the goal itself need to adapt to our available
resources and competing goals?
. Professional reward systems: Should the most quantitatively
measurable outputs such as publications and grant funds be
prioritized over more diffusely productive activities?
. Parenting decisions: How much control over a child is too
much?
TPCC is also likely applicable to other sectors. In his critique of
modern psychiatry, Carlat (2010) makes arguments very similar
to those described here regarding the role of experts and technical
knowledge. Most generally, this discussion of TPCC reinforces
the general importance of striking a balance between two
extremes along multiple dimensions by showing how things can
go wrong when one set of such extremes is chosen. I thus note the
complementarity of Holling and Meffe’s (1996) “golden rule” of
environmental management (i.e., maintain critical types and
amounts of ecological variation) with the pursuit of Aristotle’s
“golden mean,” or the desirable middle ground between two
extremes along each of the dimensions described by TPCC.

Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/8698
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